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INTRODUCTION
By early 2000, the stock market run-up ended. In the ensuing decline, wealth fell
precipitously. Simultaneously, the needs for more retirement savings grew. Life ex-
pectancy rose, the baby boom generation approached retirement, and incomes contin-
ued to rise, necessitating increasing savings to reach similar standards of living in
retirement as previously.
Due to the falling resources and rising needs retirement income adequacy fell.
But it is possible that households had built up enough of a buffer to withstand the
ensuing drop in wealth and to still be adequately prepared for retirement. This paper
estimates by how much the adequacy of retirement savings declined, whether and
when households were adequately prepared for retirement, and how long it will take
for the average household to reach the same level of retirement income adequacy as
at the peak of the boom.
Understanding whether households were adequately prepared for retirement dur-
ing the boom of the 1990s has important policy implications. If households were ad-
equately prepared for retirement and if they continued to be adequately prepared for
retirement after the fall in wealth, the policy focus would be less on increasing sav-
ings, but more on the distribution of household savings. But if households were inad-
equately prepared for retirement, greater public policy efforts have to be made to
increase savings overall and not just for particular groups.
THE STOCK MARKET AND HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
The analysis uses two data sources, the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) and the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System [BoG, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e]. The FFA provides quar-
terly data describing the financial flows in the U.S. economy by sector from 1952 to
the present. The household sector in the FFA comprises both households and non-
profit organizations1. In comparison, the SCF is a triennial cross-sectional survey of
the assets and liabilities of a representative sample of all households.68 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Household wealth declined sharply after the stock market boom ended. From
March 2000 to March 2001, stock holdings declined by $3 trillion [BoG, 2002, Table
L.100]. Falling prices accounted for 86 percent of this decline, and share sales for the
rest. Stocks fell by another $1.2 trillion by June 2002. Total household wealth fell
year-on-year during six out of nine quarters ending in the second quarter of 2002,
making this its only losing streak in the post-war era. By June 2002, households had
lost $3.3 trillion since March 2001 [BOG, 2002, Table B.100]. The resulting real de-
cline was large enough to erase most gains since late 1998, so that real household
wealth was 2 percent below that of December 1998 by June 2002.
One indication of retirement income adequacy is the wealth to income ratio. If age
earnings profiles are constant, if the employment to population ratio by age stays the
same, and if the overall employment to population is constant, average wealth rela-
tive to average income is just the average household’s wealth to its average income
over its working life adjusted by a constant. This implies that households of different
ages and different cohorts were on the path to reaching the same wealth to income
ratio relative to retirement needs as previous generations of older workers. In June
2002, financial wealth was 2.5 times personal income, the lowest level since June
1995, suggesting a sharp drop in retirement income adequacy from 2000.
Since the wealth decline followed rapid growth, households may have had a buffer
built up that still left them adequately prepared for retirement. To measure retirement
income adequacy, the actual wealth to income ratio needs to be compared to a target.
There are three concepts of retirement income adequacy. First, a household may
be adequately prepared if it can maintain the same real consumption as during its
working years. Usually, 80 percent of pre-retirement income is considered adequate
[Aon, 2001]. Households no longer need to save for retirement, taxes are lower, work
related expenses disappear, the family size of retirees is smaller than that of workers,
and households eventually pay off their debt. Second, retirement income adequacy
can be defined as a constant nominal level of consumption in retirement. Hence, real
consumption is expected to decline in retirement. Third, real consumption may de-
cline if the marginal utility of consumption is constant and uncertainty about income
and life expectancy are introduced [Engen et al., 1999]. The marginal utility of certain
consumption today is higher than the marginal utility of uncertain consumption in
the future.
Findings on retirement savings adequacy differ. Gustman and Steinmeier [1999]
concluded that households were adequately prepared because the average household
could replace 86 percent of pre-retirement income in nominal terms. Engen et al.
[1999] found that 40-50 percent of households fell short of what they needed for ad-
equate retirement income. As their calculations were based on a stochastic model,
only 50 percent of households should be expected to meet the target savings. Their
replacement ratio for the median household was still 72 percent, leading the authors
to conclude that households were close to being adequately prepared for retirement.
Several studies concluded that households were inadequately prepared for retire-
ment. Moore and Mitchell [1997] found that the median household would have to save
an additional 16 percent annually of earnings if it were to retire at age 62 and an69 STOCK MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME
additional 7 percent annually for retirement at age 65. Their estimate of a savings
rate of 7.3 percent for households wishing to retire at age 65 was three times of what
households actually saved [Moore and Mitchell, 1997]. This meant that households
had on average between 75 percent and 88 percent - depending on marital status – of
what was needed when retiring at 65 in 1992 [Mitchell and Moore, 1998]. Bernheim
[1993] calculated that baby boomer households were only at 34 percent of their target
savings rate. Also, Gustman and Steinmeier’s [1999] find that households fell short by
28 percent, using a real replacement ratio. Lastly, Wolff [2002a] concluded that 61
percent of households could not replace 75 percent of their pre-retirement income in
retirement in 1998, up from 56 percent of households in 1992.
What does a shortfall relative to adequate savings mean? In some cases, a short-
fall will still allow households to finance most of their expected consumption. Engen et
al. [1999] point out that the households used in Moore and Mitchell [1997] could still
finance more than 90 percent of the consumption prescribed by their model with no
additional savings.
The distribution of wealth matters. Engen et al. [1999] calculated that households
in the 75 percent percentile - the closest income group for households with average
incomes - had 121 percent to 172 percent of what they needed for retirement. For the
median household, the same ratios ranged from 47 percent to 124 percent. Thus, the
median household reached only 62 percent of the preparedness of the average house-
hold in 1992. Moreover, Wolff [2002a] showed that the gap between average and me-
dian wealth to income ratios grew further by 1998. Gustman and Steinmeier [1999]
found that households in the bottom quartile had nominal replacement ratios of 50
percent and real replacement rates of 33 percent, compared to nominal replacements
of 121 percent and real replacement rates of 81 percent for the top quartile. Also,
Wolff [2002a] found that 16 percent of households could replace less than 25 percent of
their pre-retirement income and that 43 percent of households could replace less than
half of their pre-retirement income during retirement. Thus, some households will face
retirement consumption shortfalls, even if households are on average adequately pre-
pared2.
To make ends meet, when facing an income shortfall, households will have to
curtail their retirement consumption. In fact, one of the distinctions between studies
that concluded that households are adequately prepared for retirement and those that
did not is their consumption pattern in retirement. Engen et al. [1999] and Gustman
and Steinmeier [1999] concluded that households are adequately prepared for retire-
ment based on declining real consumption.
Changes in consumption after retirement suggest that retirees will reduce hous-
ing and related costs by about 20 percent, and that low income household, which are
more likely to fall short of adequate retirement, will be more likely to reduce food and
clothing expenditures than higher income households [Aon, 2001]. Research on how
working families cope with income shortfalls also suggest that reduction in the num-
ber of meals taken or in the amount eaten is one of the primary ways to reduce
consumption [Boushey et al., 2001]. Savings shortfalls may mean reduced living stan-
dards, which may be not be desired by the household.70 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY IN THE 1990S
To calculate retirement income adequacy in the 1990s, the findings by Engen et
al. [1999] and Gustman and Steinmeier [1999] are used as starting points. While Engen
et al.’s [1999] study optimizes the marginal utility of consumption under uncertainty,
Gustman and Steinmeier [1999] focus on maintaining a certain standard of living in
retirement. Moreover, Gustman and Steinmeier [1999] calculate nominal and real
replacement ratios. And both studies concluded that households were adequately pre-
pared for retirement. Hence, the results here are likely representing the upper bound
of retirement preparedness for the average household.
Although the calculations for target wealth to income or replacement ratios vary,
the determinants of these ratios are similar across studies. Target rate calculations
begin by identifying the optimal consumption level in retirement, and then calculate
the necessary savings. Consumption is usually a function of income, personal tax
rates before and after retirement, and life expectancy [Wolff, 2002a; Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1999; Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Moore and Mitchell, 1997]. In Engen et
al.’s [1999] study, consumption is additionally a function of personal time preference
and risk aversion. The required savings are calculated by assuming a long-term real
rate of return. The only time varying determinants are tax rates and life expectancy,
although often a simplified tax schedule that is constant over time is used. Target
ratios thus can be extrapolated by adjusting for changes in average life expectancies.
Most studies that have calculated target wealth to income or replacement ratios,
relied on data from 1992 [Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999; Engen et al., 1999; Mitchell
and Moore, 1998; Moore and Mitchell, 1997]. Hence, the actual wealth to income
ratios are adjusted by demographic changes to allow for a comparison with the target
ratios in 1992.
Gustman and Steinmeier [1999] provide a nominal replacement ratio of 86 per-
cent and a real replacement ratio of 60 percent in 1992. These ratios are increased by
one-fifth to account for the lower income needs of retirees, raising them to 103 per-
cent and 72 percent, respectively. The replacement ratios are further adjusted as they
included social security3. The adjusted real replacement ratio without housing wealth
was 72 percent. Assuming that the remaining 28 percent had to be covered by finan-
cial wealth, private wealth would have to increase by 47 percent, i.e. financial wealth
equaled 53 percent of its target. With housing wealth, private wealth was at 67 per-
cent of its target in 1992. Thus, the private wealth to income ratio for 1992 was either
100 percent, 67 percent (real, with housing wealth), or 53 percent (real, without hous-
ing wealth) of the target private wealth to income ratio.
Engen et al.’s [1999] methodology can also be used to calculate how much of their
target wealth to income ratio households had reached in 1992. Engen et al. [1999]
reported a target wealth to income ratio for the 75th percentile of the SCF, which
includes the average household, of 4.39. The financial wealth to income ratio for 1992
[BoG, 2002b] amounted to an average of 1.78, and the financial and housing wealth to
income ratio to 5.23 for married households headed by somebody between the ages of
51 and 62. That is, households had 41 percent of their target financial wealth to in-
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income ratio. Since these targets are derived by optimizing the marginal utility of
consumption, instead of assuming a constant standard of living, no further adjust-
ments are made.
The target values are held constant over time, but the actual wealth to income
ratios are adjusted to hold demographics constant at the level of 19924. Cohorts with
higher life expectancy should be expected to have more savings for retirement. Thus,
wealth to income ratios are deflated by the changes in the life expectancy at age 65.
Also, wealth to income ratios are aggregated over all households. As the share of older
workers is increasing, this aggregate measure should decline. Again, the ratios are
deflated by the changes in the share of the elderly. Similarly, wealth to income ratios
should increase if the average age of workers is rising since workers have fewer years
to save for retirement, again requiring deflation of the ratios:
(1)










The adjusted wealth to income ratio, W/Y, in period t is the actual wealth to
income ratio adjusted for changes in the average age, AGE, of workers, for changes in
the life expectancy at 65, LE65, and for changes in the over 65 year olds, 65plus,
relative to 1992. Further, changes in the average age and the life expectancy are also
adjusted for the lost or gained compounded interest, where the long-term interest
rate, rLT, is equal to the ten-year treasury rate in period t5. The input values are actual
changes of the average age of workers, of life expectancy at age 65 [SSA, 2002, 2001],
and of the share of the population over 65 [Census, 2002].
Table 1 summarizes the changes in the adequacy levels from 1992 to 20016. If the
starting point in 1992 was an adequacy level below 100 percent, households – on
average – never reached adequate retirement savings. If the starting point in 1992
was 100 percent or higher, households continued to have more than adequate retire-
ment savings through 2001. The losses in adequacy were substantial, and large enough
to reduce retirement income adequacy at the end of 2001 to the same level as in 1995
or as in 1996, depending on the definition of wealth. The declines are less pronounced
when housing wealth is included. The losses in adequacy from 1999 to 2001 ranged
from 12 percentage points for financial and housing wealth with a starting adequacy
level of 67 percent to 31 percentage points for financial wealth with a starting ad-72 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
equacy level of 100 percent. It is noteworthy that only if it is assumed that households
reduce their consumption in retirement, households were on average adequately pre-
pared for retirement in 2001.
TABLE 1
CHANGES IN RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY FOR
THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD, 1992 TO 2001
Year Financial wealth to income Financial and housing wealth to income
Adequacy 100% 53% 41% 119% 100% 67%
level in 1992
Actual to Actual to Actual to Actual to Actual to Actual to
target levels target levels  target levels target levels target levels target levels
1993 103.2 54.6 41.4 119.1 101.3 67.9
1994 100.4 52.6 39.3 114.0 97.9 65.6
1995 109.5 58.0 43.3 121.1 105.0 70.4
1996 115.2 61.0 45.7 123.6 107.7 72.2
1997 124.8 66.1 49.7 129.2 113.4 75.9
1998 129.6 68.6 51.5 132.5 116.7 78.2
1999 142.4 75.3 58.1 144.7 126.0 84.4
2000 123.3 65.3 48.8 130.6 114.3 76.6
2001 111.1 58.8 43.0 124.9 108.9 72.9
Notes: Author’s calculations. See text for detailed descriptions of the methodology and data sources.
Data for calculations based on Engen et al. [1999] – 42 percent adequacy and 131 percent adequacy,
respectively – exclude pension reserves
So far, the discussion has focused on the average household. To calculate the
figures for the median household, two steps are necessary. First, the actual wealth to
income ratios for the median household are calculated by interpolating the ratio of
actual wealth to income ratios for the average household relative to the median house-
hold between 1992, 1995, and 1998. For the years after 1998, the ratio of the two
wealth to income ratios is assumed to change at the average rate of change from 1989
to 1998 (table 1). Multiplying the wealth to income ratios from the FFA with the ratio
of median to average wealth to income ratios generates the wealth to income ratio for
the median household. Second, the wealth to income ratio for the median household
is extrapolated as before, and compared to a target wealth to income ratio of 2.92 in
1992 [Engen et al., 1999]. The average financial wealth to income ratio for the median
decile in 1992 was 1.65, and the average financial and housing wealth to income ratio
for the median decile was 4.09. Hence, the median household had reached 56 percent
of its target when only financial wealth is considered and 140 percent when financial
and housing wealth are considered.
Table 2 shows the changes in retirement income adequacy for the median house-
hold. The adequacy ratios increased in 1997, 1998, and 1999, and declined thereafter.
Moreover, the financial wealth to income ratio’s decline is more pronounced for the
median household than for the average household since the median household’s fi-
nancial wealth to income ratio is declining relative to the average household’s. The
median household was worse prepared for retirement in 2001 than in 1992, when only
financial wealth is considered. The opposite is true, when housing wealth is added as
the adequacy ratio is still 20 percent higher in 2001 than it was in 1992.73 STOCK MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME
TABLE 2
CHANGES IN RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY
FOR THE MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD, 1992 TO 2001
Year Ratio of median to Ratio of median Actual to target Actual to target
 average financial to average financial levels, financial  levels, financial
wealth to  and housing wealth wealth to income, and housing wealth
income ratios  to income ratios with 56% to income, with 140%
adequacy in 1992  adequacy in 1992
1993 81.81 74.16 49.7 141.9
1994 77.88 75.80 44.9 140.2
1995 77.60 79.12 49.3 154.0
1996 77.31 82.44 51.9 163.8
1997 77.03 85.76 56.2 178.1
1998 74.47 85.31 56.3 181.6
1999 71.92 84.85 61.3 197.1
2000 69.37 84.40 49.6 177.0
2001 66.82 83.93 42.1 168.3
Notes: Author’s calculations. See text for detailed descriptions of the methodology and data sources.
Data for calculations exclude pension reserves.
THE FUTURE OUTLOOK
Given the previous section’s results, two issues arise. If the initial adequacy level
was 100 percent or above and further increases were desired by households, the ques-
tion is how long it would take households to reach peak adequacy levels again. If the
starting point of less than 100 percent was correct, the question is how long it would
take to reach adequate retirement savings.
Generally speaking, retirement savings are described by the well-known life cycle
hypothesis. Households increase their savings with age during their working lives
and decumulate their savings when they retire to maintain a predetermined level of
consumption [Mirer, 1979; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954]. Under uncertainty, each
household’s desired consumption depends on its age, its income, its time preference
rate, its risk aversion, and the expected rate of return. With a positive time prefer-
ence rate, households require a non-negative rate of return on their savings to com-
pensate for foregoing current consumption. Since the measure used here is an aggre-
gate wealth to income ratio, changes in the share of over 65 year olds should affect
wealth to income ratio, such that a greater share of over 65-year-olds would result in
a lower wealth to income ratio. Thus, retirement wealth is a function of income, age,
life expectancy, the share of over 65 year olds, time preference, risk aversion, and the
rate of return.
For the 1990s, income growth, demographic changes and time preference, equal
to the real rate of return, suggest a rising wealth to income ratio. Increases in wealth
need to at least keep pace with increases in income prior to retirement. Engen et al.
[1999] even suggest that higher income earners should have more retirement wealth
relative to their incomes as they face greater income uncertainty. As income growth
accelerated in the latter part of the 1990s, increases in wealth should have also in-
creased, possibly faster than income. Also, since the average age of workers rose, life
expectancy at 65 increased or remained stable, and the share of over 65-year olds74 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
declined from 1997 to 1999 savings should have increased, too. Moreover, from 1992
to 1999, the stock market grew annually by 17.4 percent, whereas income increased
by 5.2 percent per year, suggesting a naïve growth rate of wealth to income of 12.2
percent. Instead, wealth to income increased only by 5.8 percent per year. Most house-
hold assets were not held as corporate equities, also reflecting households’ risk aver-
sion [Engen et al., 1999; Barsky et al., 1997]. At their peak, households’ direct and
indirect equity holdings amounted to 49.5 percent of total financial assets in 1999
[BoG, 2002a, Table B.100e]. Thus, the average rate of return on households’ aggre-
gate portfolio – defined as holding gains relative to total financial assets – was 8.1
percent over the same period, or 9.6 percentage points less than the average stock
market growth rate [BoG, 2002a, Tables B.100, F.100 and L.100]. Also, savings models
assume constant age (and cohort) specific savings rate. But unexpected increases in
household wealth can lead to lower savings rates. Households contributed about 8.7
percent of personal disposable income to their financial assets from 1992 to 1999,
below the average of 12.2 percent for the prior forty years [BoG, 2002a, Tables F.100
and L.100]. Similarly, more assets and higher incomes allowed households to borrow
more since they had more collateral. Household debt relative to personal disposable
income grew from 82 percent at the end of 1992 to 98 percent at the end of 1999 [BoG,
2002a, Tables B.100 and F.100]. On average, households borrowed more when assets
rose and when they fell. Debt increased 1.3 times as much as year-on-year holding
gains when holding gains were positive, and 1.4 times as much as the absolute decline
in holding gains, when holding gains were negative [BoG, 2002a, Tables B.100 and
F.100]. The declines of asset values may be associated with simultaneous income
drops. The correlation coefficient between annual changes in personal disposable in-
come (PDI) and debt from 1952 to 2001 is 0.38, and the correlation coefficient between
changes in PDI and consumer credit is 0.72. Thus, household debt is used for con-
sumption smoothing.
To analyze possible paths for future wealth to income ratios, a parsimonious model
that still has good predictive abilities, defined by the following equation, is used:
(2) ln(
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where the adjusted wealth to income ratio, W/Y, depends on the weighted average of
the real rate of return, ROR, on the share of equities out of financial assets, E/A, on
the savings rate, S/PDI, and on the lagged dependent variable. The term H  is a normally
distributed random error term. A logarithmic specification is used for each variable.
All economic variables are from the FFA [BoG, 2002a], except the CPI, which is
taken from BLS [2002]. The data for life expectancy are from NCHS [2002] and SSA
[2002]. Average age is calculated as a weighted average of workers covered by Social
Security in a given year [SSA, 2002]. Missing demographic data are interpolated.
The dependent variable is the demographically adjusted wealth to income ratio.
Because Engen et al.’s [1999] calculations assume a fixed portion of retirement in-
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all determinants of a standard life cycle model, age, life expectancy and income, are
controlled for by the design of the dependent variable. Further, by adjusting this
measure for changes in the population make-up, this ratio should theoretically be a
constant plus a random error term.
But it is possible that the wealth to income ratio may systematically vary with
four factors, as discussed earlier. For one, households may borrow against their as-
sets. This is controlled for by the dependent variable as wealth is the difference be-
tween assets and liabilities. Second, the rate of return, the savings rate7 and the
portfolio allocation may differ systematically from their trend. Thus, the adjusted
wealth to income ratio is a function of these three variables plus the lagged dependent
variable, which is included to account for omitted variables.
The model describes the determinants of the wealth to income ratio for the aver-
age household. Additional factors that may influence household savings are ignored,
such as race, education, marriage status, and homeownership. Hence, the results are
those for a representative household. What is lost in specificity on the household
level, though, is gained in terms of accuracy of the influence of each macro economic
factor since the use of aggregate data allows for the use of higher frequency data, i.e.,
quarterly data instead of annual or tri-annual data.
To test if the model has good predictive powers, the following procedure is em-
ployed. The model is estimated from 1952 to 19978, thus preserving the standard 18
quarterly observations for goodness of fit tests [Makridakis and Hibon, 2000]. The
three contemporaneous explanatory variables are forecast through the second quar-
ter of 2002, by randomly generating 1,000 observations for each variable in each quar-
ter. To avoid unreasonable values, the savings rate cannot be negative, the real rate
of return has its lower bound defined by its historic minimum, and the equity alloca-
tion cannot be less than 2.5 standard deviations below its long-term average. Further,
the savings rate, the equity allocation and the real rate of return cannot be higher
than 2.5 times above their means9. Comparing each forecast’s root mean squared
error (RMSE) to that of a random walk yields Theil’s U statistics of 0.28 for the wealth
to income ratio, 0.33 for the financial wealth to income ratio, 0.12 for the wealth to
income ratio excluding pension reserves, and of 0.61 for the financial wealth to in-
come ratio without pension reserves. That is in each case, the model is a better pre-
dictor than the random walk model.
TABLE 3
ASSUMPTIONS FOR INPUT VARIABLES
Variable Definition Mean Standard deviation
ROR Weighted average of real rate of return 3.41 9.15
ROR2 (without - 3.40 8.51
pension reserves)
E/A Share of equities out of total assets 29.15 7.24
E/A2 (without - 26.66 7.92
pension reserves)
s Personal savings rate 7.94 2.11
Notes: All figures are in  percent. Real rates of return are annualized values. For detailed variable
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To forecast wealth to income ratios, the regression is estimated from 1952 to 2001
(table 4). The real rate of return is a consistent significant and positive predictor, the
equity allocation is also consistently positive, but not always significant, and the per-
sonal savings rate is unexpectedly negative when pension reserves are included, but
positive, when they are excluded. In the case of the wealth to income ratio that ex-
cludes pension reserves, though, there appears to be a positive relationship between
savings rates and the wealth to income ratio.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR WEALTH TO INCOME RATIO
Explanatory Fin. wealth Wealth (incl. Fin. wealth Wealth (w/o
Variables (incl. pensions) pensions) to (w/o pensions) pensions) to









ln(S/PDI)t -0.027*** -0.021*** 0.012** -0.001









Constant 0.797*** 0.521*** -0.152** 0.334***
(0.145) (0.120) (0.066) (0.114)
N 193 193 193 193
Adj. R-squared 0.978 0.982 0.980 0.953
Notes: All estimates are based on 2-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS). Standard deviations in brackets.
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent-level.
** Indicates significance at the 5 percent-level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1 percent-level.
The analysis of the simulations focuses on two issues. First, how long will it take
households to recover their losses relative to their incomes? And second, how long
will it take households – on average – to reach adequate retirement income? The
results for the financial wealth to income ratio – including pensions – are summarized
in table 5. In particular, households, in the aggregate, have no realistic chance of
reaching the peak value of wealth to income reached in 1999 in the next 50 years. But
there is an increasing chance over the next 50 years that their aggregate financial
wealth to income ratio will be 10 percent or 15 percent higher than it was in 2001.
Moreover, the average household is virtually guaranteed to maintain an adequate
retirement wealth to income ratio if the starting adequacy level was 100 percent.
These results should not be surprising. The adjusted wealth to income ratio should
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wealth to income ratios over time by saving more than they traditionally have, if rates
of return are higher than historical averages, or if risk aversion is not constant. To
see this, consider a best case scenario (table 5), whereby the real rate of return, and
the equity allocation are assumed to be equal to the average of the period from 1995
through 1999 with 10.2 percent and 40.5 percent, respectively. The savings rate is
assumed to remain at its historic average of 7.9 percent. Under this scenario, the
average household would reach its previous peak again in 2014. Hence, even under
extraordinary circumstances, it would take more than a decade to recover the wealth
to income losses for the average household.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS FOR FINANCIAL WEALTH
TO INCOME (INCLUDING PENSIONS), 2005 TO 2050
Year Prob. of Actual rel. Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of
falling to peak 10% gain 15% gain 20% gain adequate adequate
below past (best case rel. to rel. to rel. to savings savings
peak scenario) 2001 2001 2001 with 100% with 53%
1992 1992
2005 100 91 5 0 0 100 0
2010 100 98 21 1 0 100 0
2020 100 101 30 3 0 100 0
2030 100 101 32 3 0 100 0
2040 100 101 34 3 0 100 0
2050 100 101 33 2 0 100 0
Note: All figures are in percent.
Table 6 shows similar results for the total wealth to income ratio, with the excep-
tion that here, even in the best case scenario, the average household is not expected
to reach its previous peak again. This is due to the fact that gains from a higher equity
share and from a higher rate of return are significantly smaller than for other wealth
to income ratios.
TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS FOR WEALTH
TO INCOME (INCLUDING PENSIONS), 2005 TO 2050
Year Prob. of Actual rel. Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of
falling to peak 10% gain 15% gain 20% gain adequate adequate
below past (best case rel. to rel. to rel. to savings savings
peak scenario) 2001 2001 2001 with 100% with 67%
adequacy adequacy
 in 1992  in 1992
2005 100 78 0001 0 00
2010 100 75 1001 0 00
2020 100 74 0 0 0 98 0
2030 100 74 6 0 0 89 0
2040 100 74 9 0 0 91 0
2050 100 74 9 0 0 93 0
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Using financial wealth without pensions, households are expected to reach their
peak again with financial wealth, aside from pensions, in about ten years (table 7).
This series excludes all DB pensions and hence may be influenced by the growth of DC
plans as long as they are cashed out. It is important, though, to keep in mind that the
fact that the target ratio is kept constant assumes that the share of income paid for by
pensions remains stable, too. This seems a particularly strong assumption since the
incidence of DB has declined, while much of DC wealth is not transferred into annu-
ities. Moreover, whether the past and expected future increase in DC plans will con-
stitute an increase in retirement income adequacy for the average household depends
on whether DC plans increase private savings or not. The empirical literature finds
support for both positions [Engen and Gale, 2000; Poterba, et al., 1996a, 1996b]. Fur-
ther, the rise in DC plans has also coincided with rising wealth inequality. The median
household may see smaller increases in the wealth to income ratio than the average
household, if inequality rises.
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS FOR FINANCIAL WEALTH
TO INCOME (EXCLUDING PENSIONS), 2005 TO 2050
Year Prob. of Actual rel. Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of
falling to peak 10% gain 15% gain 20% gain adequate
below past (best case rel. to rel. to rel. to savings with
peak scenario) 2001 2001 2001 42% adequacy
 in 1992
2005 100 99 52 17 3 0
2010 96 136 94 81 60 0
2020 30 220 100 99 97 0
2030 6 308 100 100 100 0
2040 1 388 100 100 100 0
2050 1 456 100 100 100 0
Note: All figures are in percent.
The results for the total wealth without pensions relative to income exhibit a
slight tendency in the forecast for the ratio to increase, albeit very slowly (table 8).
But the average household is not expected to reach its peak again, under reasonable
assumptions, within the next 50 years, and there is only a small chance of seeing a 10
percent or 15 percent gain relative to 2001.
CONCLUSION
The stock market fluctuations of the 1990s led to large increases in household
wealth. As retirement is the most important savings goal, this paper analyzes how the
fluctuations of wealth may have affected retirement income adequacy between 1992
and 2001. Moreover, this paper estimates how financial wealth relative to income, and
consequently retirement income adequacy, may develop in the future.
The findings paint a mixed picture. The average household was adequately pre-
pared for retirement, even after the decline in the stock market, if it is assumed that79 STOCK MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME
retirement income will fall in retirement. If a fixed real level of retirement income is
considered, the average household was inadequately prepared for retirement, even
after dramatic wealth gains in the 1990s.
TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS FOR WEALTH
TO INCOME (EXCLUDING PENSIONS), 2005 TO 2050
Year Prob. of Actual rel. Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of
falling to peak 10% gain 15% gain 20% gain adequate
below past (best case rel. to rel. to rel. to savings with
peak scenario) 2001 2001 2001 131% adequacy
 in 1992
2005 100 98 0 0 0 100
2010 100 108 2 0 0 100
2020 100 120 8 0 0 100
2030 100 125 12 1 0 100
2040 100 127 12 1 0 100
2050 100 128 13 1 0 100
Note: All figures are in percent.
The losses in average household wealth since 1999 were substantial, leaving many
households in 2001 as well off as in 1995 or 1996, depending on the definition of wealth.
Moreover, on average households can only expect to reach their peak wealth to in-
come levels again within the next 10 to 20 years if either their savings rate is assumed
to increase, or if an above average real rate of return is assumed, or both. Without
such changes, it is also unlikely that households will be able, on average, to reach an
adequate level of retirement savings, assuming that their income needs in retirement
do not decline in real terms.
The aggregate numbers suggest that many households may continue to be inad-
equately prepared for retirement. Further, the results also suggest that substantial
improvements in the retirement income adequacy of households are on average hard
to foresee without institutional changes that would increase the personal savings rate
or the expected rate of return. However, the savings rate seems to be a more appro-
priate policy target than the expected rate of return.
Consequently, as new policy proposals are discussed to reform the U.S. retire-
ment system, their likely effects on personal savings rates should be considered. If the
personal savings rate is likely to increase, the adequacy of retirement savings is also
likely to grow. For instance, research suggests that savings incentives, such as 401(k)
plans may be useful in raising personal savings rates for low income households, but
not for high income ones.
NOTES
I am grateful to Eileen Appelbaum, Beth Almeida, Amy Harris, Bernie Morzuch, and one anony-
mous referee for their comments on earlier versions of this article. All remaining errors are my
sole responsibility.80 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
1. Data for nonprofit organizations are available from 1987 to 1999. Since the wealth held by nonprofits
averaged 4 percent of total household sector wealth, the figures here overstate the wealth of
households only by a small factor.
2. Mitchell et al. [2000] and Engen et al. [1999] found that black and Hispanic married households
experienced a larger shortfall in adequacy than whites, and that less education resulted in less
adequacy. Mitchell and Moore [1998] also found that single households were less adequately
prepared than married ones.
3. As the adjusted nominal replacement ratio was 100 percent, no further savings, and no further
adjustments were needed.
4. As the economic determinants of target ratios are time invariant, no changes are made to the
target ratios.
5. This assumes an age-invariant savings rate and a constant labor force participation rate for people
65 and older.
6. Errors may arise as the FFA and the SCF define the household sector differently. Adjusting the
values from the SCF, calculating the actual to target values and comparing these to the ratios
based on the SCF shows no systematic error. The FFA based adequacy was 8 percent lower than
the SCF based one in 1995, but 0.6 percent higher in 1998. The FFA based financial and housing
wealth adequacy was 1.7 percent higher than the SCF one in 1995, but 12 percent lower in 1998.
7. As the savings rate may be endogenously related to the dependent variable due to the wealth
effect, it is instrumented by regressing it on its own value lagged once and on all other explanatory
variables.
8. All variables are stationary.
9. See table 3 for the details on the input variables.
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